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Abstract 
This paper constructs a hypothetical case study based around the Benchmark Land Value 
assessments within the landmark Parkhurst Road, London case decided in the High Court in April 
2018.  It attempts to illustrate how developers were gaming the system and how the 2014 Planning 
Practice Guidance aided them to do that.  The discussion centres on the extent to which new 2018 
National Planning Guidance has addressed the identified flaws and what additional changes might 
be needed to that guidance to solve any outstanding problems. 
Keywords: Development Viability Assessment; UK Government; Planning Practice Guidance; 
Benchmark Land Value. 
Introduction 
Development Viability Assessment (DVA) has become a core theme within parts of the UK planning 
system in an attempt to bring sites forward for development while trying to capture some of the land 
value gains made from the granting of permission to develop. Viability assessments can be required 
at both plan-making and decision-making stages.  In plan-making they are needed to set the policy 
requirements for planning obligations (POs) across different site typologies within a Local Planning 
Authority (LPA) area (area-wide assessments).  In decision-making they are needed to ratify or vary 
these requirements in specific cases (site-specific assessments). 
The Government response to the Housing, Communities and Local Government Select Committee 
inquiry on land value capture (MHCLG, 2018a) makes it clear that their priority is to evolve this 
approach to land value capture rather than change it.  They are committed to making the system for 
obtaining land value capture through developer contributions more ‘transparent, efficient and 
accountable’ while continuing to ‘explore options for further reforms to better capture land value 
uplift’.  This is ‘providing [the Government] can be assured that the short-run impact on land markets 
does not distract from delivering a better housing market.’  (MHCLG, 2018a, Page 8) 
In line with this objective, the most recent National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF), published in 
2018 and updated in February 2019 (MHCLG, 2019), has continued to put financial viability at the 
heart of the system.  However, it suggests a number of reforms to the system based on these principles 
of transparency, efficiency and accountability.   
In the previous 2012 NPPF, it stated that planning authorities should pay ‘careful attention to viability’ 
to ensure delivery of development and set the framework for the sharing of development gain. It 
stated that: 
[T]o ensure viability, the costs of any requirements….such as requirements for affordable 
housing, standards, infrastructure provision and other requirements should… provide 
competitive returns to a willing landowner and a willing developer to enable 
development to be deliverable (CLG, 2012: 41) 
The 2019 NPPF does not change this basic requirement to balance the requirements of landowners, 
developers and local planning authorities (LPA).  But, through the accompanying guidance (NPG, 
2018), it does seek to rectify a number of practices within the detailed operation of the viability system 
that have been alleged to have reduced the benefits to the LPA and community to the advantage of 
landowners and developers.   
The detailed advice on viability assessments based on the 2012 NPPF is contained in the 2014 Planning 
Practice Guidance (PPG) (CLG, 2014).  The vehicle assessing viability is a standard development 
appraisal model as practiced by developers and their agents for many years.  That standard model is 
a residual model based on the concept that the land value is a residual of the value of the completed 
development less the costs of developing that site, including a return to the developer for taking 
development risk.   
One of the costs of the development is meeting the LPA requirements for POs but, as the policy 
statement above implies, where the extent of POs reduces the returns to landowner and developer 
below that which is ‘competitive’, the obligations need to be reduced to ensure viability and hence 
deliverability. 
This paper will briefly review the literature around DVAs paying particular attention to the valuation 
model and planning policy/guidance in this area.  Planning policy sets the framework within which the 
valuation process operates but valuers are also bound by mandatory standards (in the case of RICS 
surveyors) and industry best practice guidance.  This policy and practice framework underpins 
negotiations between landowner/developer and local authority for the provision of, primarily, 
affordable housing.  
The paper will identify some of the more detailed issues around the assessment of land value and 
discuss actual and potential changes to policy, guidance and appraisal technique to address the issues 
identified. These changes may enable a more rational distribution of development value between 
landowners, developers and the community.   
The literature surrounding viability has a number of threads and a wide-ranging review is provided by 
McAllister (2017).  He identifies a range of issues and literature including policy innovation,  calculative 
practices (modelling) allied to their application to development viability, and transparency. Some of 
these themes are progressed in this special issue.  For example, virtually all of the papers in this issue 
(McAllister (2019), Adams (2019), Catney and Henneberry (2019) and Crook and Henneberry (2019)) 
refer to flaws and biases within the development appraisal model (for example, valuation variation, 
bias and instability) and the cultural and behavioural environment within which the negotiation of POs 
take place (Dunning, et al, 2019).  This paper accepts the conclusion of McAllister (2019) that: 
Even if an accepted operational definition of BLV [Benchmark Land Value] were to emerge, 
the use of viability models prone to such levels of error and potential bias to set and 
implement planning policy is likely to remain vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour and prone 
to miscalculation.   
However, that does not mean that flaws in policy and practice leading to inappropriate application of 
the model should be tolerated, even if the nature of development appraisal modelling will always 
leave room for negotiation bias and variation.   
This paper concentrates on the technical detail of the development appraisal model operating within 
the current and emerging policy and practice framework while accepting that these wider ranging 
issues also have a major impact on land value capture within the UK planning system.  It aims to 
identify a number of problems in the past policy framework, how they were manipulated in practice 
and how they have been addressed in the new national planning practice guidance (MHCLG, 2018b).  
The objective is to examine whether the changes will rectify the identified problems and what further 
changes may be needed to the current framework if that part of the gaming process identified in the 
MHCLG (2017) consultation is to be finally put to rest. 
 
The 2014 Planning Policy/Practice Guidance  
Verdung and van de Doelen (1998) identify circulars and policy guidance as instruments for 
communicating policy requirements.  In the case of development viability detailed planning policy and 
practice guidance from the MHCLG exists.  Pawson et al (2005) suggest that policy innovation leads to 
the creation of both winners and losers from the system.  The 2014 Planning Practice Guidance (PPG) 
is widely cited as having created a system that favoured landowners and developers over the 
community in the form of the LPA.  Research by, or funded by, stakeholders in the process includes 
that by Shelter (Grayston; 2017), a consortium of London Boroughs (Sayce, et al; 2017) and the RICS 
Research Trust (Crosby and Wyatt, 2015). A similar academic literature has evolved (see Colenutt, et 
al, 2015; McAllister, et al, 2016b; Crosby, et al, 2013; Crosby and Wyatt, 2016). These all identified 
serious flaws in the viability system leading to the erosion of affordable housing proportions within 
private sector developments.   
This erosion seems surprising.  Since 2012 the average return on capital employed (ROCE) of the seven 
largest housebuilders has increased from 12% to 32% by the financial year end 2017.  Over the same 
period, their completions have increased from 42,000 to 70,000 and profit per plot increased from 
£19,000 to £62,000.  Across the sector as a whole, the provision of affordable housing has declined 
from 58,000 to 42,000 per annum while the number of residential units built has increased from 
135,000 to 217,000. This represents a fall from 44% of completions in 2012 to 13% in 2017 (Crosby, 
Devaney and Wyatt, 2019).  
One argument set out in the literature suggests that major flaws in the 2014 PPG are responsible 
and they relate to the assessment and use of a Threshold or Benchmark Land Value (BLV).  The 
guidance on the assessment of BLV within a viability assessment was driven by a set of instructions 
that were similar for both area-wide and for site-specific assessments.  Area-wide instructions were 
contained in paragraph 14 and site-specific instructions in paragraph 23 of the 2014 PPG.  Paragraph 
14 was as follows: 
Central to the consideration of viability is the assessment of land or site value. The most 
appropriate way to assess land or site value will vary but there are common principles which 
should be reflected. 
In all cases, estimated land or site value should: 
 reflect emerging policy requirements and planning obligations and, where applicable, 
any Community Infrastructure Levy charge; 
 provide a competitive return to willing developers and land owners (including equity 
resulting from those building their own homes); and 
 be informed by comparable, market-based evidence wherever possible. Where 
transacted bids are significantly above the market norm, they should not be used as part 
of this exercise. 
Paragraph 23 was identical except for one sentence added to the opening statement of the 
paragraph and a slight tweak to the next sentence.  In addition, the word emerging was omitted 
from the first bullet point. 
BLV became a major battleground within planning appeals. Crosby and Wyatt (2015) identified 
contradictions between the first and third bullet points above as a major cause for the reductions in 
POs in some planning appeal decisions and they also identified the reliance by planning Inspectors on 
landowner and developer evidence of land transactions as an issue.  These issues were picked up in 
the landmark Parkhurst Road planning appeal case which ended up in the High Court in 2018. The 
issue surrounded circularity in the valuation process.  This is a major issue for this paper and these 
arguments will be set out later in this paper. 
In addition to the question of the role of land value within the appraisal modelling process, the 
application of the 2014 PPG raised some governance and transparency questions.   
Governance and Transparency 
The role of DVA is to apportion development gains between the three parties and Jakeman, et al 
(2006) identify the issue of asymmetric abilities in modelling.   
The uses of models by managers and interest groups, as well as modellers, bring dangers. It is 
easy for a poorly informed non-modeller to remain unaware of limitations, uncertainties, 
omissions and subjective choices in models. (Jakeman, et al, 2006).    
McAllister, et al (2016) found that local politicians and planners had a weak understanding of 
development appraisal1 and they also found that landowners and developers have major incentives 
to manipulate the viability system within the 2014 framework.  It is the landowners and developers 
                                                          
1 There is an education issue here not developed in this paper. The development appraisal literature lies 
completely outside of the mainstream planning literature while the policy framework is firmly embedded in the 
planning process.  Viability could be characterised as bringing the two cultures of real estate and planning truly 
together for the first time as both disciplines have tended to be educated mostly (not always) apart from each 
other in the past.  This is changing.  
who commission viability assessments at the site-specific level. Viability studies are also cloaked in 
confidentiality and many are not released in full into the public domain.   
However, in the run up to the consultation on the revised NPPF, there was an increasing call for greater 
transparency of information and evidence surrounding viability appraisals.  Grayston (2017) identified 
full transparency of appraisal evidence as one of her five main recommendations for addressing the 
falling levels of affordable housing and Crosby and Wyatt (2015) called for the disclosure of all viability 
assessments that aim to reduce the policy level of public contributions.   
Publically available information on these cases varies widely and needs to be made more 
transparent and consistent. In some cases there is only the basic planning information and the 
Inspector’s report; in others, details of the appraisals and viability assessments are available 
for scrutiny. If landowners and developers wish to challenge area wide and site specific 
community contributions, they need [sic] put their reasoning and evidence, including financial 
details, into the public domain. (Crosby and Wyatt, 2015, p26). 
Under the previous NPPF, the conditions were in place for some stakeholders to act under the cloak 
of confidentiality to potentially maximise their returns and emerge as winners.  The lack of 
transparency and asymmetric abilities and resources leads to the question of whether the lack of 
transparency contributed to landowners and developers maximising their outcomes.   
The new 2018 NPG has introduced measures for greater transparency of information used in the 
modelling process.  The question of whether greater transparency will lead to wider scrutiny of the 
viability modelling process, increased awareness and less asymmetry of knowledge is an important 
one for the future application of viability modelling within the planning system.  It is however not a 
particular question developed in this paper which concentrates on the policy framework and how it 
drives the modelling process. 
 The viability modelling process 
Viability is assessed within a traditional development appraisal modelling process and there are two 
basic approaches to the valuation of development land; the market comparison method and the 
residual valuation method.  These are set out in various textbooks and professional guidance notes 
(Wyatt, 2013; RICS, 2019).  
The latest RICS Guidance Note (RICS, 2019) identifies a market comparison approach using direct 
comparisons of other land transactions.  Normally in valuation, direct comparison is the preferred 
method but RICS (2019) qualifies this for development land and gives equal status to a residual 
valuation model.   
The residual model determines the value of the land as a product of the value of the completed 
development less the cost of providing this development.  The costs include  a return to the developer 
and also any planning costs, including POs.  Provision of affordable housing can also manifest itself as 
a reduction in the value of the completed development, often termed Gross Development Value 
(GDV). 
There are two major variations on the residual valuation theme.  The basic residual approach normally 
uses current values and costs and can be expressed simply as: 
Land Value = Value of Completed Development (net of sale costs) – (Development Costs Incl. 
Developers Profit).   
Development costs include some financing of the build costs and of holding the land through the 
development period as well as a lump sum profit usually expressed as a simple return on development 
costs or on the value of the completed development. 
 However, the basic model can be transformed into a discounted cash flow method where the timing 
of the inflows and outflows can be considered more carefully. The basic approach of a discounted cash 
flow is that the future revenues and costs generated by the development are set out for each period 
through the development.  The periods can be daily, monthly, quarterly, etc.  The costs and values are 
discounted at a target rate of return or internal rate of return that should cover any borrowing costs 
and also compensate the developer for any risks taken.  The rate of return represents the profit earned 
by the development expressed as a periodic rate of return, not as a simple lump sum profit measure 
as in the basic residual approach.  Any discounted surplus of revenues over costs is the amount 
available for the land purchase at the beginning of the development. 
As in the basic residual, planning obligations are part of the costs and can also be represented as a 
reduced completed development value in the case of affordable housing.  
The theoretical model is simple but the application can be very varied and Coleman, et al (2012)  
identify a number of major issues with some of the inputs; such as the representation of profit, the 
use of current or forecasted values and costs and the treatment of finance.  In addition to these 
criticisms, which suggest the model can be applied inconsistently, McAllister (2017) identifies issues 
of uncertainty around the level of inputs. Uncertainty around inputs coupled with variations in 
approach can lead to an extensive range of possible outputs.  This is so even if the uncertainty around 
the inputs is based on an entirely reasonable range within the context of normal valuation variation; 
for which an extensive valuation literature exists (See for example, Wyatt, 2013, 349-53).  To 
summarise, the valuation of development land is imprecise and the variation in land valuations can be 
significant as it is a small residual value based on some very large inputs (such as the value of the 
completed development and the costs of development).  Hence the conclusion of McAllister (2019) 
reported earlier. 
These appraisal issues are discussed in detail elsewhere (Byrne, et al (2011), Crosby, et al (2013), 
Coleman, et al (2013), Crosby and Wyatt (2015, 2016), Sayce, et al (2017)).   
Consistent conclusions from this valuation literature are that development valuations are one of the 
most variable and uncertain valuations to produce and, where development appraisal is applied within 
the 2014 PPG framework for the purpose of assessing viability, there is one additional major issue to 
be addressed.  That is the determination of the BLV caused by the wording of paragraphs 14 and 23 
of the 2014 PPG 
The problem identified within the literature is formed around the fact that any one of the inputs into 
a residual, regardless of whether it is undertaken by the basic or the discounted cash flow methods, 
can be turned into the product or result of the valuation if all the other inputs are fixed.  Normally, the 
land value is the output.  Where the land value can be fixed (upon purchase for example where a price 
is paid), the residual output becomes profit, assuming the other inputs are also fixed. 2 
In the case of viability assessment there is a third potential residual outcome.  If both land value and 
developer’s profit are fixed within the model, the POs become the residual. A high land value and/or 
a high developer return will reduce the POs afforded by the scheme.  High costs and low completed 
values will also have the same impact but the former is the focus of this paper.  If the developer can 
fix both the land value and developer profit the residual becomes the POs.  Arguments around other 
inputs then affect the POs and not the returns to the developer or the landowner.   
The modelling problems: circularity and input uncertainty 
In April 2018, the High Court agreed with the case made by Islington Borough Council that the 
approach taken in many planning appeal cases assessing BLV within viability assessments was flawed,  
citing Crosby and Wyatt, (2015).  The Judge strongly recommended the RICS revisit their 2012 (RICS, 
2012) viability guidance note to surveyors in an effort to address these flaws.  MHCLG also revisited 
                                                          
2 This is not affected by whether the valuation is carried out by either the simple residual model or the more 
complex discounted cash flow. Despite the criticisms of the basic residual in Coleman, et al (2012), viability 
appraisals tend to use the basic residual.  Crosby and Wyatt (2016) investigated a number of planning appeals 
and found that it was used in all but a few larger cases.   
 
their practice guidance and, after consultation in 2017 (MHCLG, 2017), published new viability 
guidance in 2018 (MHCLG 2018b). 
The circularity problem is not straightforward.  It is set out in both Sayce, et al (2017) and Crosby and 
Wyatt (2015; 2016).  Development land value is a residual of the development process and the price 
paid for land should be the product of the value of the completed development less the costs of 
providing the development.  If POs are fixed then it is a cost and if the value of the completed 
development falls, the land value should fall.  Changes in house prices should drive land values, not 
the other way around (Ball, 1996).   
Once the land is purchased, land becomes a fixed price and the development profit should become 
the residual.  Changes to the market environment and any unexpected construction issues over the 
development period will alter expected cash flows and change the residual, in this case profit.  
Development profitability should be highly volatile and because of that development profits are 
targeted at ROCEs of 20% plus and internal rates of return of 15% to 20%.  This is a huge risk premium 
as a risk free internal rate of return is barely 1% in the UK in 2019 (Crosby, et al, 2019). 
The circularity argument is that this risk, for which the developer is rewarded via these returns, has 
been transferred to the LPA via the application of the PPG 2014.  Within viability assessments, this is 
achieved by making sure the residual amount falling out of a residual valuation is the POs.  As the 
developer’s profit is virtually fixed, the developer also needs to try and fix the land element (BLV).   
Developers relied on bullet point three of paragraph 23 of the 2014 PPG to deliver this outcome.  It 
stated that the BLV should: 
be informed by comparable, market-based evidence wherever possible. Where transacted 
bids are significantly above the market norm, they should not be used as part of this 
exercise. 
Under PPG 2014, developers successfully argued that this statement allows comparable market 
evidence to fix the land price as it shows the market norm level of values.  Put more simply, where the 
comparable land transactions are available, this is the primary basis for assessing BLV. Planning 
Inspectors tended to agree. 
However, bullet point one suggests that all BLVs should reflect policy requirements.  Until the 
Parkhurst Road decision, developers had successfully argued that policy compliant just meant the 
delivery of viable levels of POs and that each agreement was evidence of the viable level of POs on 
that particular site.  These arguments revolve around the definition of policy compliant.  Is it the full 
plan requirements or is it POs that are deemed viable?  When the latter assumption is used, the 
unadjusted land transaction evidence fixes the BLV, the developer is allocated a profit, and the POs 
become the moveable residual value. 
This situation is identified within much of the literature and within some LPA supplementary planning 
guidance, including the Mayor of London’s Supplementary Planning Guidance, and now within the 
High Court.  Circularity was introduced as a result of the fundamental flaw within the 2014 PPG that 
policy compliant wasn’t defined, coupled with the interpretation put on the two bullet points within 
paragraphs 14 and 23 by planning inspectors and other decision makers.  
The land price should be the outcome of the residual model.  But if the land price is taken outside the 
model by the use of comparable transactions, and the developer’s return is held constant, the residual 
of the model becomes the POs. At this point, the developer knows that they can pay more for land 
and this increases the landowner’s return.  Despite the fact that the developer pays over this surplus 
to the landowner, it does not reduce the developer’s return.  Instead, the developer uses the PPG to 
argue for an increase in the BLV within the viability assessment, making the POs unviable.  Until 
recently, the Planning Inspectors upheld this approach. 
Crosby and Wyatt (2016) concluded: 
 In a policy context that requires planning obligations to be set at a level that does not 
jeopardise developers’ and landowners’ competitive returns, a developer can outbid others 
to acquire a site knowing that the price paid (or market valuations that use this price as 
evidence) can be used as evidence to reduce the level of planning obligations.  
(Crosby and Wyatt 2016, 1731) 
These discussions in previous papers are predicated on the developers overpaying for the land and 
then clawing this overpayment back by passing it onto the LPA in reduced or even zero POs.  This 
argument relies on developers all overpaying and creating the evidence base to stop the actual price 
being unsupported by other transactions.   
The existing literature does not identify another possible explanation.  There may be another force 
at work based on inappropriate choice of model (or more accurately inappropriate application of 
inputs into the model).  Development takes place over time and developers will price development 
options, which may not be identifiable within the residual model, and also they may project changes 
in costs and values over the development period.  Not using value and cost change in the modelling 
can lead to undervaluation in markets that are expected to grow over the development period.  
There are provisos to this conclusion as it depends on the relative growth rates in values and costs 
and the relationship between values and costs (for example, high land value areas will benefit from 
this effect more than low land value areas). 
The 2014 PPG made it clear that the modelling process should use current costs and values only.  
PPG Viability (CLG, 2014) Paragraph 8 refers to area-wide plan-making and states that viability 
assessments for that purpose should not include any future increase in costs or values. 
Current costs and values should be considered when assessing the viability of plan policy. 
Policies should be deliverable and should not be based on an expectation of future rises in 
values at least for the first 5 years of the plan period. 
When it comes to site-specific assessments, the guidance is contained within paragraph 17 and is 
unambiguous.  The only context in which value and cost change can be included is when schemes 
are large enough to be phased. 
Viability assessment in decision-taking should be based on current costs and values. Planning 
applications should be considered in today’s circumstances. 
However, where a scheme requires phased delivery over the medium and longer term, 
changes in the value of development and changes in costs of delivery may be considered. 
Forecasts, based on relevant market data, should be agreed between the applicant and local 
planning authority wherever possible. 
Research Questions 
The viability literature identifies a fundamental flaw in the viability modelling process under the 
2014 PPG.  That literature suggests it can lead to overpayment for land and that overpayment can be 
clawed back through a viability assessment. The developer can use land market transaction evidence 
to prove that the “overpayment” is in fact a market norm under policy compliant assumptions that 
are based on delivery rather than requirements.  Under this regime, developers have successfully 
argued that sites are unviable at the full policy requirements in the plan and these should be 
reduced.   
In April 2018, the High Court case concerning the Parkhurst Road site partially rejected this approach 
and confirmed a different approach to transaction analysis.  The first aim of the paper is to examine 
this decision to determine the implications. 
The UK Government have also attempted to change the approach to viability and produced new 
planning guidance in 2018.  The second aim of this paper is examine the new National Planning 
Guidance (NPG) (MHCLG, 2018b) and examine it in the context of the two modelling issues relating 
to circularity and the use of growth models. 
In order to address the questions the paper constructs a case study of a viability assessment based on 
the valuation inputs cited in the Parkhurst Road case.  This site is used to illustrate the application and 
potential outputs of viability models and illustrate in detail how the appraisal process works within 
viability.  The modelling is simplistic and does not represent the true complexity surrounding 
development appraisal modelling in general and the particular aspects of Parkhurst Road.  A very basic 
residual valuation based on typical real estate valuation texts (Wyatt, 2013) is adopted. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows.   
First the simple residual model is set in context with a short discussion of the treatment of the three 
major inputs of gross development value (value of completed development), construction related 
costs and developer’s profit.  Second, the relevant details of the Parkhurst Road case are set out and 
discussed and third, the changes to planning guidance which impact on BLV are identified 
This sets the context for the case study modelling exercise.  That is followed by a discussion of the 
results and conclusions around whether the changes to the policy and practice framework will create 
the environment for more balanced negotiations around POs or whether further changes are 
necessary. 
Residual model 
The model inputs 
(a) Gross development value 
Gross development value is normally constructed from a simple comparative model of transaction 
evidence from the current market.  In the residential market, this can range from a comparison with 
the sale prices of owner occupied housing to a more sophisticated comparative process for rented 
accommodation using a rent/capital value ratio based on initial returns of similar types of property 
(see, for example, Wyatt, 2013).  It is not the objective of this paper to delve more deeply into the 
construction of these valuations but they are based normally on current sales values even if in a real 
development appraisal some forecasting would take place.  This point is important for this paper and 
it is unrealistic to assume that developers take no notice of possible price changes through a 
development period when framing their bid for the land at the commencement of the development 
period. 
(b) Construction Costs 
Construction costs are often based on comparative information and at first sight it might appear that 
costs based on comparative indicators of the current cost of construction contracts also exclude any 
forecasts of how those costs may change over the life of the project.  However, construction costs can 
be based on current tender prices and constructors making bids for a project may well include any 
prospective cost increases in their current bids.  So what may appear as a current cost could have 
some future expectation of cost change already built in. 
Changes in costs may not, and probably will not, be at the same rate as the changes in values.  
However, where they are assumed to change at the same rate, the impact on any model outcome is 
to increase the residual amount.  Modelling under the assumption that values will grow over the 
development period but costs have already been subject to a growth factor, and don’t need further 
projection, will increase the residual still further.   
(c) Return to the developer. 
The third major component of the residual model is the developer’s profit.   There is little debate as 
to what those returns should be in the literature (Crosby, et al, 2019).  The new 2018 NPG has virtually 
fixed the return to the developer in viability studies. Return to the developer is not the focus of this 
paper except as an outcome of the analysis. 
Development Viability Assessment Hypothetical Case Study based on Parkhurst Road High Court 
Decision (Parkhurst Road Limited v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and 
The Council of the London Borough of Islington [2018] EWHC 991 (Admin) Case No. 
CO/3528/2017.) 
This case study is a former Territorial Army base on Parkhurst Road, North London.  The original 
application Ref P2013/4950/FUL, dated 6 December 2013, was refused by notice dated 17 October 
2014. The developer appealed and the appeal was dismissed by a decision of the planning inspector 
on September 22nd 2015 (Appeal Ref: APP/V5570/A/14/2227656).   
However, in dismissing the appeal, the inspector considered the viability assessment, in particular 
the BLV and in effect found for the developer’s side of the argument.  In summary, the inspector 
grounded the determination of the BLV in the comparable evidence of other sites sold and an 
external valuation of the actual site.  He upheld the developer’s assertion that the price paid for the 
site of £13.25 million was in line with land values in the vicinity and should be used as the BLV, even 
though it did not leave enough surplus development land value, according to the developer, to 
provide the developer with any more return than 16.5% on costs.  The local authority had argued 
that a policy compliant land value to secure a 50% affordable housing provision was around £5 
million and that a price of £13.25 million was an overpayment due to the circularity issues identified 
in the literature.   
Despite winning the overall appeal (the submitted scheme was rejected), the London Borough of 
Islington appealed the BLV part of the decision and the subsequent appeal hearing in June 2017 
(APP/V5570/W/16/3151698) found for Islington’s approach and reversed the BLV findings. 
The developer appealed and the case went to the High Court. Judge Holgate accepted the 
overpayment arguments citing the Crosby and Wyatt (2015) paper on circularity. The original 
Parkhurst Road appeal decision was evidence that the Planning Inspectorate had at last begun to 
realise the problem (APP/V5570/W/16/3151698). Paragraph 39 of the inspector’s decision explicitly 
discusses the tension between the two bullet points in PPG paragraph 23 where comparables should 
be used but the land price should be policy compliant.  The High Court judicial review confirmed that 
part of the decision.  Both accepted that the land value had to be policy compliant and that policy 
compliant meant the provision of plan levels of POs. All land transactions have to be adjusted to that 
assumption.     
Changes to National Planning Guidance (2018) 
In the light of the increasing anxiety expressed in the literature, fully represented in the arguments 
around Parkhurst Road, the Government consulted in 2017 and produced new guidance in 2018.  
BLV is addressed in paragraphs 14 to 16 of the new NPG (2018) and developer’s profit is addressed 
in paragraph 18.  Profit is now virtually fixed at between 15% and 20% of gross development value 
which means that either land value or POs are the potential residual value.  
Paragraph 14 introduces the concept of existing use value plus a premium as the main approach to 
assessing BLV:   
Benchmark land value should: 
 be based upon existing use value 
 allow for a premium to landowners (including equity resulting from those building their 
own homes) 
 reflect the implications of abnormal costs; site-specific infrastructure costs; and 
professional site fees and 
 be informed by market evidence including current uses, costs and values wherever 
possible. Where recent market evidence is used to inform assessment of benchmark land 
value this evidence should be based on developments which are compliant with policies, 
including for affordable housing. Where this evidence is not available plan makers and 
applicants should identify and evidence any adjustments to reflect the cost of policy 
compliance. This is so that historic benchmark land values of non-policy compliant 
developments are not used to inflate values over time. 
(CLG, 2014, Paragraph 14) (emphasis added) 
 
The last bullet point in paragraph 14 raises a number of issues.  Policy compliance is not defined 
elsewhere so arguments about what it means may continue.  However, it does relate the market 
evidence of transactions to adjustments for policy compliance, picking up on the Parkhurst Road 
rulings.  In some previous cases market evidence was used with no reference to policy compliance. 
It also uses the word current which appears to rule out any growth modelling.  The implications of 
that will be highlighted by the modelling process.   
There is limited guidance in NPG 2018 on the EUV plus premium basis of BLV and the evidence 
required to determine the premium element.  Paragraph 16 is set out in full below. 
“How should the premium to the landowner be defined for viability assessment? 
The premium (or the ‘plus’ in EUV+) is the second component of benchmark land value. It is 
the amount above existing use value (EUV) that goes to the landowner. The premium should 
provide a reasonable incentive for a land owner to bring forward land for development 
while allowing a sufficient contribution to comply with policy requirements. 
Plan makers should establish a reasonable premium to the landowner for the purpose of 
assessing the viability of their plan. This will be an iterative process informed by professional 
judgement and must be based upon the best available evidence informed by cross sector 
collaboration. For any viability assessment data sources to inform the establishment the 
landowner premium should include market evidence and can include benchmark land values 
from other viability assessments. Any data used should reasonably identify any adjustments 
necessary to reflect the cost of policy compliance (including for affordable housing), or 
differences in the quality of land, site scale, market performance of different building use 
types and reasonable expectations of local landowners. Local authorities can request data 
on the price paid for land (or the price expected to be paid through an option agreement). 
     MHCLG, 2018b, paragraph 16 (Emphasis added) 
The important phrases concern the data sources and suggest that it should include market evidence 
and can include evidence from other viability assessments. At present, although MHCLG want the 
primary basis to be EUV plus the premium, the evidence base is still biased towards market 
transactions and that will open up the use of land transaction evidence.  The implications of that are 
set out below. 
Circularity and growth modelling. 
A residual valuation with simplified valuation inputs from the Parkhurst Road appeals is utilised 
below to identify how the circularity question works and whether a growth model would have 
produced a different set of outcomes.  
The important components of the residual model are: 
 the value of the completed development;  
 the costs of development including construction, finance and fees;  
 a profit to the developer;  
 any section 106 and other payments to the community; and  
 the land value/price.   
The figures are hypothetical but broadly based on the actual figures used in the Parkhurst Road 
valuations.  Table 1. sets out the basic inputs. 
Table 1 - Parkhurst Road Current Values and Costs  
Insert Table 1 here 
In this particular case EUV plus a premium is an irrelevant concept as the EUV was deemed 
negligible.  Additionally, both parties agreed that the profit level should be about £7,000,000.    
Table 2. sets out four possible approaches to the development viability assessment. 
Table 2 – Valuation Scenarios 
Insert Table 2 here 
Valuation 1 is a policy compliant land valuation based on a residual approach assuming the delivery 
of the full complement of POs.  It has ignored the transaction price.  It suggests the BLV should be £7 
million.  It is the policy compliant market value assessed by a residual approach. 
However, the developer had paid £13.26 million for the site and the developer argued for £13.25 
million as the BLV.  Using RICS guidance and the PPG as authority, they argued that other sites had 
sold for similar figures and therefore that proved that the purchase price was also the norm and 
should be used.  In the first appeal the inspector agreed that the BLV should be £13.25 million.  
 Valuation 2 sets out the consequences of that decision.  With a fixed land value and a fixed profit 
level, the residual component becomes the POs, and they are halved.   
The second inspector overturned that and found for a BLV of £6.75 million.  The High Court agreed 
that £6.75 million was the policy compliant BLV. By finding for a BLV of £6.75 million, the second 
inspector and the High Court judge implied £13.25 million was an overpayment.  But is it really an 
overpayment or is there a modelling issue here?   
Valuation 3 sets out an alternative solution that suggests that, if a growth model is used, both the 
overpayment for land and full planning requirements can be explained. Say, for example, residential 
sales values are expected to rise over the development period and the costs are based on a partially 
fixed price tender contract over the development period (which still normally allows for some 
changes).  The residual valuation would throw up a higher residual land value.  If we assume a 
completed sale value at say £66,387,500  (17.5% increase on current sale value) and costs at perhaps 
£33,000,000 (10% increase), what will the valuation look like?3.  Despite having really paid £13.25 
million for the site, and producing the full policy compliant POs, the development still produces a 
profit of over 7,600,000.  There is no overpayment. But the existing modelling framework for 
viability can’t identify this more rational explanation of the actual viability of the site. 
Valuation 4 illustrates the pre-2018 situation and how it ended up when the planning inspectors 
made decisions to use the unadjusted prices paid for sites as the basis for BLV.  In this hypothetical 
case, it leads to excessive developer and landowner returns.  Instead of the LPA getting the full 
policy compliant amount of £12,500,000, they end up with half that at £6,250 and the developer 
walks away with a basic profit level at £7,000 plus another hidden additional bonus of almost 
£7,000, virtually doubling the profit to nearly £14 million.  The landowner still gets £13.25 million.  
While the proceeds of the development increase by £7 million approximately, the LPA gets a 
reduced amount of over £6 million.  A £13 million windfall shared between developer and 
landowner. 
If this pre-2018 process was seen to be a game it would be likened to “pass the parcel”.  The parcel is 
the residual value that is left after all other development costs have been paid for out of the 
development proceeds.  Developers usually hold this residual parcel and therein lies the risk of 
development (for which they are richly rewarded by a massive risk premium above the risk free rate).   
The case study has shown that the residual parcel amount within any appraisal is originally in the 
hands of the landowner (Valuation 1).  Normally, when the land is purchased, the residual passes to 
the developer.  But in the case of viability assessments, the developer, by getting a (virtually) fixed 
level of profit within the assessment, can pass that parcel through to the LPA.  The parcel holds the 
development risk (Valuation 2).  Valuations 3 and 4 show an added perspective to the circularity issue 
with the addition of value change.  Having used the system to shift the additional land costs onto the 
                                                          
3 The growth factors are exaggerated here to illustrate the point.  They have no grounding in market evidence 
around Parkhurst Road at the particular time period 
LPA, the developer has improved their position.  They still hold the up-side benefits of risk taking 
without all of the downside and if variation is positive (growth) they are in a position to keep it all. 
The case study is partial.  However, there is evidence that land has been sold above the prices 
suggested by the viability appraisals with policy compliant POs, that developers require their returns 
to be protected and that the model being used in viability assessments is the basic residual model.   
The evidence for prices above valuations is not systematic but there are instances of sites, having gone 
through viability appraisals which reduced the affordable housing content, being sold with the 
planning permission for significantly above the BLV in the viability assessment.  For example, Crystal 
Palace Road in East Dulwich.  In July 2015 the existing use value of the property was argued to be 
£1.4m and the development land value only £383,000 by the appellant in a planning appeal.  The 
inspector accepted the valuations and agreed that the site was not viable, and removed the affordable 
housing.  But in February 2016 the Land Registry recorded a price of £5.1 Million for the sale of the 
site.  Why would anybody bother to get planning permission if the development value was just over 
20% of existing use value?  The answer is the residual development value was not £383,000. It was 
realised at £5 million with the benefit of a permission that had no affordable housing.  Even allowing 
for the reinstatement of the full policy level of affordable housing, there is a likelihood that the site is 
viable with a land value residual above the existing use value. 
There is also anecdotal evidence of developers arguing that their returns should be protected through 
time.  A prime example is a large site in Battersea where the LPA agreed to reduce the affordable 
housing content based on the developer’s arguments that an existing project has fallen in value 
relative to costs.  The developer argued that they needed a reduction in affordable housing 
contributions to maintain their target IRR of 20%. Review mechanisms such as this, which allow 
development return shortfalls to be reclaimed, appear quite bizarre within the normal risk/return 
framework.  In effect, the developer’s downside risk has been passed to the LPA.  Development returns 
are high to allow for high variation in those returns so they should accept that they win when the 
market goes with them and lose when it does not.    
Discussion and Conclusion. 
There is little doubt that the 2014 PPG created a market place that could be distorted and impact on 
the level of land prices. Developers could argue that that there is no proof that land prices are 
distorted and that current market levels are justified but it is obvious that the mechanisms exist for 
some sort of clawback within the modelling process.  If the viability model presented here is 
accurate, the Parkhurst Road land transaction was grossly over-priced.  If the price was the proper 
justifiable price, the viability model as applied within PPG can’t recognise it.  Regardless of the 
correct interpretation, the landowner and developer won the gaming process until the second 
Parkhurst Road decision, confirmed in the High Court, and the publication of the new NPG. 
While the old regime developed to allow developers to pass on increased payments for land to the 
LPA in the form of reduced POs, the new planning policy and practice guidance attempts to stop the 
gaming process and reframe the negotiations.  The emphasis on assessments at the local plan-
making stage is designed to stifle arguments at the decision-making stage.  Unfortunately, BLV 
assessments, the target for the gaming issues, is more complicated at the plan-making stage as the 
policy requirements are not yet fixed.   
Although NPG has recognised some of the issues surrounding the operation of the old PPG, it is not 
clear that it has found the correct solutions.  The first point of contention is the meaning of policy 
compliance.  NPG (2018) has not defined clearly what is meant by policy compliance and so 
arguments will persist that land transaction evidence is policy compliant as policy compliance is the 
delivery of viable POs.  Policy compliant needs to be unambiguously defined on the basis of planning 
requirements in the plan, not what is being delivered on the ground. 
Second, despite attempting to place major emphasis on EUV plus a premium, there is no recognised 
evidence base for premiums under the new policy regime.  Reliance on existing policy requirements 
and viability assessments for the premium will only be workable when the new regime is 
established.  Even then, developers/valuers will continue to place more emphasis on market 
evidence and land transactions.  However, assuming definitions of policy compliance related to plan 
requirements are adopted, Parkhurst Road and the new NPG require that transaction evidence is 
adjusted to plan policy levels of POs.  If this definition prevails, it will solve one part of the circularity 
issue.  However, there is still the problem of a lack of any stated planning requirements at the plan-
making stage so arguments need to be based around emerging new plan policies rather than existing 
policies. 
The new NPG has not solved the other issue related to growth modelling.  It persists with the use of 
current costs and values.  Even when transaction evidence is adjusted, if LPAs allow the adjusted 
land price to be inserted into the residual model without allowing for growth, they will allow the POs 
to become the residual amount.  The POs will still be eroded.  Viability modelling guidance must 
make sure that under no circumstances is the land value, found from market comparison of land 
transactions, used as a BLV in a residual valuation.  The residual land value and the transaction based 
land value must be assessed separately and should become part of the iterative process outlined in 
paragraph 16 to identify BLV.  If that provision is not included, circularity and growth modelling 
issues will continue to distort the modelling process. 
The Parkhurst Road decision is still fundamentally flawed.  The question is how, even when the EUV 
was a meagre £750,000, the site still did not deliver a full complement of POs within a very high 
value residential market in London?  If the residual development land value is above EUV, there is an 
argument for saying it is viable.  Development values are created by the planning regime, the 
planning regime needs to work within a market environment but not be subservient to it. This will 
only be possible if land transaction evidence is relegated to the role of cross-checking other evidence 
of BLVs. 
Both problems discussed in this paper, the use of comparables and the use of current values and costs, 
have a similar source, the old PPG.  The 2014 PPG was fundamentally flawed.  Paragraphs 8, 14, 17, 
and 23 of the Viability section of PPG appeared to be a major cause of the reduction in the provision 
of affordable housing provided through POs and needed redrafting to: 
 Define policy compliance 
 Place the emphasis away from the land transaction comparables, and 
 Allow the model to be applied as it is in the market place with due regard to expected events over 
the development period.   
The new NPG has addressed the first and second issues, up to a point, but has seemed reluctant to 
act on the third.  The emphasis has changed so that policy compliance dominates the assessment of 
comparable evidence.  There is an explicit requirement to use land sales in evidence of sites that are 
delivering policy compliant POs (or are adjusted to policy compliance for any non-policy compliant 
sites).  The lack of a definition of policy compliant still leaves the door slightly ajar.  
Regarding the use of current costs and values, the new PPG has not (yet) solved the problem and 
needs one word deleting from it, current. 
There is no doubt that the new NPG has responded to many of the flaws identified in the application 
of viability modelling.  It accepted that the 2014 PPG had been used to game the system to the benefit 
of landowners and developers.  It may have left other flaws alone and introduced some new areas of 
debate and negotiation.  Overall, the improved transparency regime under the new NPG should 
enable any issues to be addressed more quickly than under the more opaque past regime of 
development viability modelling.  Hopefully, the new NPG will be successful in reversing the trend of 
a diminishing ratio of affordable housing provided through POs. 
  
Author Note 
This paper has been developed during a period of rapid policy and practice change.  At the time of the 
first draft, Government was consulting on proposed changes to the 2012 NPPF and 2014 PPG and the 
evidence and conclusions within the paper were developed for and submitted to that consultation.  
The arguments put forward in the paper were partially accepted within the revised NPG.  Subsequently 
the author was co-opted onto the RICS committee working on the revised Financial Viability in 
Planning Guidance Note and these issues have been addressed within that committee, observed by 
the MHCLG.  At the time of submission of the final version of this paper, the RICS Guidance Note was 
still under discussion, as were possible changes to the viability section of the NPG on account of these 
arguments.  By the date of publication it is hoped that the RICS Guidance Note will have been 
published and NPG may have changed and it remains to be seen if any of the recommendations are 
included in a new NPG or the RICS Guidance Note. 
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Table 1 - Parkhurst Road Current Values and Costs  
Value completed development   £56,500,000 net of any agency costs 
Costs of development     £30,000,000 including fees and finance costs4 
Policy compliant planning obligations  £12,500,000 including CIL, AH, Section 106. 
Development profit    £7,000,000  
Existing use value (EUV) of the land  £”negligible” (agreed at £750,000) 
Price paid for the land    £13,260,000 
 
Table 2 – Valuation Scenarios 
Valuation 1 £’000 Valuation 2 £ ‘000 Valuation 3 £ ‘000 Valuation 4 £ ‘000 
GDV                 £56,500 GDV              £56,500 GDV                £66,387 GDV                £66,387 
Costs             - £30,000 Costs          - £30,000 Costs            - £33,000 Costs            - £33,000 
Profit              - £7,000 Profit            - £7,000 POs               -£12,500 POs               -£6,250 
POs               - £12,500 Land price  -£13,250 Land price    -£13,250 Land price    -£13,250 
    




                                                          
4 There is a strong argument that finance has no part to play in development appraisal and these arguments 
are set out in, for example, Coleman, et al (2013). 
 
